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The World Trade Centre attack of September 2001 and the subsequent anthrax 
letters brought the need for Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) 
counter-terrorism preparadness into focus. By and large, our understanding of the 
nature of CBRN terrorism derives entirely from military the paradigm of chemical 
and biological warfare. An examination of recent CBRN terrorism events such as 
the 1995 Sarin attack on the Tokyo subway system by a terrorist cult and the 2001 
anthrax letter attacks in the United States of America show that the military paradigm 
of CBW defence cannot be applied to CBRN terrorism.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Terrorism is a socially dangerous 
phenomenon both at the national and 
international level. It is a deliberate, 
preconceived use of force or threat 
of force, usually often focused on 
not involved persons to trigger 
a fear, through which terrorists’ 
political, ideological and religious 
requirements are to be met. In a global 
war, everyone is a target of terrorists, 
especially unprotected civilians, as 
they are the easiest target. Deﬁ  nitions 
of terrorism have certain common 
elements emphasizing the systematic 
use of physical violence directed 
against civilians to cause a general 
climate of fear when innocent people 
are targeted for political and social 
change. There are no commonly 
accepted deﬁ   nitions of CBRN 
materials, threats or incidents. For 
the purpose of this paper, however, it 
is most useful to use a rather broad 
description of the terrorist threat 
concerning CBRN materials: all uses 
of chemical, biological, radiological 
or nuclear substances and materials 
for terrorist purposes.
An increasing interest of 
terrorists in chemical and biological 
warfare agents, an easy access to 
technical information, technologies, 
materials and specialist data and 
an increase of terrorist attacks with 
the use of chemical and biological 
weapons highlight the fact that 
the risk of this kind of terrorism is growing. Chemical and biological 
agents attract terrorists because 
their production is easy and can 
be easily acquired. Even a small 
amount of these agents, due to 
their toxicity and contagiousness, 
can result in heavy losses of 
unprotected population. Of course, 
terrorism does not use only 
such chemical and biological 
agents, which are designed for 
special military purposes. Just 
realize a great amount of tanks 
transporting industrial toxic 
agents on roads and by railway, 
which may easily become a focus 
of terrorist action. 
An exact number of casualties 
or losses of lives because of CBRN 
assets usage cannot be estimated, 
but experts agree that the greatest 
effect of their use will be a large-
scale wave of fear and panic. 
Awareness of public and readiness 
of special units of the so-called 
ﬁ  rst responders (i.e. ﬁ  re-ﬁ  ghters, 
police personnel, emergency 
medical and rescue service) to a 
CBRN terrorist attack can prevent 
an uncontrolled spreading of fear 
and panic and, consequently, 
will impede terrorists to attain 
their main objective- to scare and 
dismay their victims.
2. HISTORICAL EXAMPLES 
OF THE USE OF CBRN 
DEVICES IN TERRORIST 
ATTACKS
On 20 March 1995 in Tokyo 
subway, a sarin, chemical agent, 
was used for a terrorist attack 
against non-protected civilians. 
A religious cult Aum Shinrikyo 
acquired information and technical 
means to plan, produce and use 
chemical agents for its own terrorist 
goal. This attack was a ﬁ  rst example 
of a large-scale terrorist attack with 
the use of toxic chemical agents that 
was considered by that time to be a 
domain of military forces.
The impact of this terrorist attack 
was measured in terms of numbers 
of casualties and injured, gaps in 
the technical capabilities of ﬁ  rst 
responders and a clear demonstration 
of the use of CBRN assets to attain 
the targets of terrorists. The sarin 
attack affected 5,100 persons, out of 
which 12 were casualties, 40 heavily 
affected, more than 900 moderately 
affected and many slightly injured. 
About 300 members of the rescue 
teams, including ﬁ  re  ﬁ  ghters, 
policemen and emergency medical 
personnel were also injured. These 
secondary victims were caused by 
insufﬁ  cient knowledge, training and 
technical capabilities to cope with a 
threat posed by the use of chemical 
weapons. It also revealed the fact that 
those who want to rescue must be 
properly protected.
This sarin attack also showed how 
important were the means to handle 
with immediate consequences of 
threat, such as, for example, protective 
equipment for rescue teams, detection 
and diagnosis equipment, means for 
hasty decontamination of victims, 
rescue teams and buildings, and 
how important a proper coordination 
and communication of individual ﬁ  rst responders against this type of 
terrorist attack was.
In October 2001 in the U.S. a 
series of anthrax attacks occurred. The 
ﬁ  rst information of affected persons 
came from Florida. Other cases of 
anthrax inhalation and skin infection 
appeared in New York, New Jersey, 
Maryland, Virginia, Pennsylvania 
and Connecticut. Letters containing 
powder anthrax were sent to various 
mass media and state administration 
authorities. In total, there were 
22 affected persons, 11 of them with 
symptoms on their skin and 11 more 
with respiratory system problems. 
Due to the inhalation of the agent, 
5 people died.
This case shows another example 
of the use of CBRN assets for terrorist 
attacks. Same as in Tokyo, terrorists 
acquired necessary information 
and equipment needed to launch an 
attack using the biological warfare 
agent. The so-called anthrax letters 
showed that use of combat biological 
agents could have new intended or 
not intended aftermaths that were 
not sufﬁ  ciently evident in connection 
with the use of chemical and 
biological agents to date. The impact 
on the civilians was terrible (32,000 
persons had to undergo a basic 
antimicrobiological treatment, out of 
them more than 10,000 persons due 
to a suspicion of being contaminated 
by this anthrax were recommended to 
undergo another 60-days treatment). 
Another effect of anthrax letters was 
a great contamination of buildings 
and infrastructure. Some post 
ofﬁ  ce personnel were contaminated 
and several died. If we take into 
consideration a characteristic of the 
terrorist attack already mentioned in 
the second example (i.e. the letters 
were carefully stuck down and an 
explanatory message was attached) 
it is improbable that the post ofﬁ  ce 
personnel were also an objective of 
terrorists. The consequences of these 
anthrax attacks were solved months 
and years after this event, as opposed 
to an immediate emergency in case of 
attack by chemical warfare agent.
These attacks showed a need to 
quickly detect the attack, identify its 
character and, given the nature of the 
attack, to also diagnose the persons 
contaminated by anthrax, which posed 
an enormous burden on the health 
care system. It was also necessary 
to ﬁ  nd the contaminated persons and 
to provide them a timely and proper 
care. While great efforts were made 
to remove the attack consequences, 
the specialized laboratories processed 
more than 120,000 tests for B. 
anthracis, 69% of which were carried 
out by the laboratories of the public 
medical facilities. For preventive and 
curative care, 3.75 million antidotes 
were needed. This called attention 
to the need to improve readiness and 
immediate response, which had not 
been so urgent in the case of previous 
terrorist attacks.
3. CBRN TERRORISM ATTACKS 
EXPERIENCE   
With the attack against the World 
Business Center in September 2001 
and following letters containing 
anthrax, security and the need to 
be prepared to counter chemical, 
biological, nuclear and radiological attack became the focus of attention 
of strategic planning and national 
security of almost all countries. Since 
then they have been considered as 
one of the most important challenges 
to the democratic civilization. From 
a general viewpoint, a present 
understanding of the substance 
of terrorism that uses chemical, 
biological, nuclear and radiological 
assets issues especially from a 
military paradigm of the conduct 
of chemical and biological warfare. 
These paradigms include tasks of 
intelligence service, lists of potential 
threatening by CBRN assets, 
assessment of potential targets of 
attack, risk analysis and conception 
of defense as a deterrent means. 
However, from an analysis of terrorist 
attacks with the use of CBRN assets 
it results that against terrorism, which 
uses the CBRN assets, a conception 
of defense against chemical and 
biological warfare in an armed 
conﬂ  ict cannot be applied.  
To attain a better readiness for 
defense against terrorist CBRN 
attacks, as well as development of 
prevention and response methods, 
it is necessary to create new models 
of better response to such attacks. 
A present approach to countering 
this type of terrorism resembles the 
approach to a military threat, namely 
the use of the intelligence service 
to identify the capabilities of an 
enemy, to have proper knowledge of 
NBC weapons threat designed by an 
enemy for combat purposes, analysis 
of related risks and weapons that can 
be applied, and also the assumption 
that a well prepared defense will 
discourage an enemy from an attack. 
The question is if these assumptions 
are valid.
Terrorism, especially CBRN 
terrorism, calls for new approaches 
to intelligence information. It 
requires collecting, analyzing and 
exchanging information not only on 
the organizations, but also on the 
individuals that work independently. 
There are very little events reviewed 
in such a great detail as the attacks 
of 11 September 2001 in New York 
and Washington and attacks by 
anthrax-laden letter. The intelligence 
services, especially, were criticized 
because they did not provide timely 
warning so that preventive action 
could be taken. Taking into account 
many indications that terrorists hired 
new members, trained them, planned 
and organized attacks, as well as 
the duration of the preparations to 
counter these, as mentioned by the 
media, the activity of the intelligence 
services can be perceived as a failure. 
However, it is necessary to admit 
that from the actions of individuals 
who pursue wider terrorist goals, it is 
not simple to acquire “information” 
needed for an effective countering of 
a terrorist attack. 
The military science, due to the 
transition from conventional weapons 
to the new non-conventional conduct 
of combat, started to use the term 
of “asymmetric war”. Terrorism is 
sometimes considered a civilian 
analogy to asymmetric war, where 
small-scale non-conventional attacks 
have a great impact. On the other hand, other sources view this analogy 
as imprecise because the target of the 
attack is not the armed forces, but 
unprotected civilians.
4. LEGAL INSTRUMENTS AND 
CBRN TERRORISM 
Terrorist attacks have highlighted 
the need for further efforts of the 
entire international community in 
combating this threat. In the ﬁ  ght 
against global terrorist networks 
national or regional response is 
insufﬁ  cient. Global cooperation thus 
becomes a matter of vital importance. 
For example, the European Union is a 
key player alongside with the United 
States of America (USA), China and 
Russia, on the international scene and 
has a decisive inﬂ  uence on the security 
situation in the world. By its nature, 
it is a supranational organization, 
the body of international relations 
that, after the adoption of the Lisbon 
Treaty, has a legal personality. The 
threat of a terrorist group acquiring 
CBRN materials has led governments 
and international organisations to 
adopt far-reaching regulations and 
programmes to defend populations 
against the associated risks. 
A common European approach to 
security issues of the contemporary 
world was outlined in December 2003 
when the EU Council met in Brussels 
and adopted the ﬁ  nal version of the 
European Security Strategy (ESS). 
For the ﬁ   rst time principles were 
established and clear objectives for 
the enforcement of security interests 
of the EU based on core values and 
identiﬁ   ed a range of threats and 
challenges to security concerns set. 
The main threats classiﬁ   ed in the 
ESS are: terrorism, proliferation 
of weapons of mass destruction, 
regional conﬂ   icts, state failure and 
organized crime.
These threats were described as 
new, more diverse, less visible and 
less predictable. On the other hand, 
the traditional military threat in the 
form of large-scale aggression against 
any Member State of the EU seems 
unlikely. The ESS considers an attack 
using CBRN weapons as one of the 
biggest threats to the security of the 
EU, especially thanks to advances 
in biological sciences which may 
increase the potency of biological 
weapons. The most frightening 
scenario is terrorist groups gaining 
CBRN weapons. In such a scenario 
a small group could cause damage 
similar to what was previously 
possible only for states and armed 
forces.
Tackling terrorist access to CBRN 
material is currently considered a 
priority for the European Union. 
This is acknowledged by the 
European Union Counter-Terrorism 
Strategy adopted by the Council on 
1 December 2005, and by the “EU 
Strategy against proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction and 
their means of delivery (WMD)” 
adopted by the European Council on 
12 December 2003.
The EU counter-terrorism strategy 
ﬁ  ghts against terrorism on four main 
objectives: prevent, protect, pursue and respond and with wide range 
of measures (co-operation in ﬁ  elds 
ranging from intelligence sharing 
to law enforcement and the control 
of ﬁ  nancial assets in order to make 
it easier to ﬁ  nd, detain and bring to 
justice terror suspects). 
The overall goal of CBRN policy 
is to reduce the threat and damage 
from CBRN incidents to the citizens 
of the European Union, by way of 
a coherent, prioritised EU CBRN 
Action Plan. The EU CBRN Action 
Plan is not a legal instrument. The 
Action Plan foresees three main areas 
of CBRN security work: Prevention 
(i.e. ensuring that unauthorised 
access to CBRN materials of 
concern is as difﬁ  cult as possible); 
Detection (having the capability to 
detect CBRN materials in order to 
prevent or respond to CBRN 
incidents); Preparedness and response 
(i.e. being able to efﬁ  ciently respond to 
incidents involving CBRN materials 
and recover from them as quickly as 
possible).
Protecting the population from 
terrorism and other criminal threats 
is a high priority for the EU. As 
exempliﬁ   ed by events around the 
world, there is continuous interest 
of terrorists in acquiring CBRN 
materials. The Member States are 
primarily responsible for many of 
the areas of work which are covered 
by the current policy package. They 
are responsible for protecting their 
citizens from CBRN threats by a 
host of different measures, and with 
the involvement of a wide range of 
responsible authorities.
5. A DEFENCE AGAINST CBRN 
TERRORISM
In defence against chemical and 
biological agents and in technical 
preparations, agents known to have 
been developed and used by an 
enemy as a weapon have always 
been highlighted. Such agents are on 
the list that serves as a basis for the 
development of protective technical 
means and capabilities, including 
presence detection, identiﬁ  cation, 
protection, medical measures and 
elimination of effects of these agents. 
The above-mentioned emphasis 
on known chemical and biological 
warfare agents, even bias towards 
these agents, led the military to 
conceived the defence against such 
an attack as a defence against a 
“speciﬁ   c threat“. Thus, defence 
against terrorism, in a way, can be 
viewed as defence against a “non 
speciﬁ  c threat“. A spectrum of CBRN 
means of attack provides terrorists 
with a nearly unlimited amount 
of toxic, hazardous and infectious 
agents, the production, stocktaking, 
tactical or strategic use of which 
are not included by military into a 
traditional analysis of risks. That is 
why, in coping with terrorist attack, 
civilian  ﬁ  rst responders must apply 
an integrating approach, which takes 
into an account all types of threat.  
Based on the intelligence 
information and analysis of threats 
and risks, in order to minimize 
impacts of CBRN attack, militaries 
must invest into the defense and 
protective equipment. They perform 
training to ensure a minimum impact on the armed force’s operational 
capabilities in case of eventual CBRN 
attack. Also, a proper assessment 
of the technologies and the new 
possibilities to support chemical and 
biological defense on the basis of 
prediction of potential threat in the 
next 10-15 years is used. The result 
of this assessment is identiﬁ  cation 
of areas where knowledge should be 
amended, as well as recommendations 
on how to achieve it submitted. 
A part of this assessment is also a 
presumption that these technologies, 
if used, will serve as a deterrent. 
Certainly, this consideration assumes 
that enemy’s behavior is rational or 
that enemy is able to analyze strategic 
or tactic employment of chemical 
weapons and take decisions based on 
the level of defense and capabilities 
of the opponent. 
However, this assumption does 
not apply to terrorism. Traditional 
deterrent means that it cannot stop 
a group of dissenters without any 
concrete objective. Terrorism that 
uses the CBRN assets has the greatest 
deterrent and destructive effect 
because its target is unprotected 
civilian inhabitants. There are not such 
measures that could protect civilian 
inhabitants under all circumstances. 
Even the strictest security and 
preventive countermeasures cannot 
prevent suicide assassins. There 
will always be vulnerable groups 
of people. A targeted protection, for 
example, of signiﬁ  cant  buildings, 
cities or various events can make 
terrorists change their plans and 
attack other, less protected groups of 
people. 
A critical issue is the training of 
the  ﬁ   rst reaction forces for CBRN 
attack. Before the personnel in the 
ﬁ  rst line can say what action must 
be taken and what equipment they 
need to eliminate the aftermaths of 
such attack, they must understand the 
basic aspects of chemical, biological 
and radiological agents. Though an 
average rescuer does not need to be 
a chemistry expert for these agents, 
nor must he know how to treat every 
approximately 300 human pathogens, 
he must anyway know symptoms 
of effects of these agents and basic 
treatment and decontamination 
procedures. Having this information, 
he is able to transform his knowledge 
and experience and apply them in a 
case of terrorist attack. 
In the case of threat from potential 
hazardous agents the rescue technical 
teams use standard procedures which 
encompass basic target functions like 
site inspection for threats, hazardous 
agent identiﬁ   cation, risk and threat 
analysis, assessment of protective 
equipment necessity, information 
and rescue resources co-ordination, 
hazardous agent control by preventing 
its spreading, decontaminating the 
area and consolidating the overall 
situation. After a terrorist attack, other 
important functions must be added: 
people’s evacuation, casualties’ 
clearance and treatment and evidence 
material gathering. 
6. CONCLUSIONS
The CBRN terrorism counter-
measures, in contrast to the 
recommendation of the armed forces 
structures, require shifting from a decision-taking process based on 
the detailed analysis of the enemy 
capabilities to an approach based 
on the risk analysis. To establish 
priorities, many countries carried 
out extensive consultations 
resulting in risk analyses of the 
CBRN assets. Conclusions of such 
analyses are used by intelligence 
services, anti-terrorist units, 
scientiﬁ  c agencies and institutions 
and rescue teams that have to cope 
with actual events.
However, a detailed research of 
the potential use of CBRN assets 
for terrorism does not guarantee 
that an actual CBRN attack can 
be avoided. Risks related to the 
use of CBRN assets and materials 
show how important it is to have 
consolidated capabilities available 
to respond to the threat and properly 
train rescue teams for a partnership 
within a scientiﬁ  c-technological 
community. Knowledge on 
CBRN assets that ensue from 
the usual military practice of 
preparedness must be carefully 
reviewed and immediately quit if 
they do not meet the for civilian 
protection requirements in case 
of threat. It seems to be vitally 
important for the EU Member 
States to ensure: legislation 
(which determines the duties and 
responsibilities of citizens in the 
constitution and other laws in 
accordance with EU strategic and 
legal principles), the systematic 
training of experts in the ﬁ  eld of 
crisis management, performance 
and intelligence cooperation at 
bilateral and multilateral international 
levels,  scientiﬁ  c  research  and 
technological cooperation, the 
systematic preparation of specialists 
(special forces) to combat terrorism, 
population information and 
preparation, a functional integrated 
rescue system, ﬁ  nance and logistics. 
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